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Abstract
We study the problem of eliciting and aggregating probabilis-
tic information from multiple agents. In order to successfully
aggregate the predictions of agents, the principal needs to
elicit some notion of confidence from agents, capturing how
much experience or knowledge led to their predictions. To
formalize this, we consider a principal who wishes to elicit
predictions about a random variable from a group of Bayesian
agents, each of whom have privately observed some indepen-
dent samples of the random variable, and hopes to aggregate
the predictions as if she had directly observed the samples
of all agents. Leveraging techniques from Bayesian statistics,
we represent confidence as the number of samples an agent
has observed, which is quantified by a hyperparameter from
a conjugate family of prior distributions. This then allows us
to show that if the principal has access to a few samples, she
can achieve her aggregation goal by eliciting predictions from
agents using proper scoring rules. In particular, if she has ac-
cess to one sample, she can successfully aggregate the agents’
predictions if and only if every posterior predictive distribu-
tion corresponds to a unique value of the hyperparameter.
Furthermore, this uniqueness holds for many common dis-
tributions of interest. When this uniqueness property does not
hold, we construct a novel and intuitive mechanism where a
principal with two samples can elicit and optimally aggregate
the agents’ predictions.
1 Introduction
Imagine that a principal, Alice, wishes to estimate the prob-
ability of rain tomorrow. She consults two agents, Bob who
says 80%, and Carol who says 10%. How should Alice ag-
gregate these two widely disparate predictions? If she knew
that Bob happened to have spent the day studying radar im-
agery, whereas Carol just looked outside for a second, it
would seem obvious that Alice should give much higher
weight to Bob’s prediction than Carol’s. In other words, in
order to aggregate these predictions, Alice needs to know the
agents’ confidence about their reports.
The aggregation of probabilistic information is an impor-
tant problem in many domains, from multiagent systems to
crowdsourcing. In this paper, we propose a general method
of eliciting predictions together with a measure of confi-
dence about those predictions, and show how to use this in-
formation to optimally aggregate in many situations.
We consider a Bayesian model where a principal, who can
consult a group of risk-neutral agents, wishes to obtain an
informed prediction about a random variable. The random
variable follows a parameterized distribution that is gener-
ated by some unknown parameters, the prior distribution of
which is common knowledge. Each agent privately observes
some independent samples of the random variable and forms
a belief about it. The principal then elicits the agents’ pre-
dictions of the random variable, and her goal is to optimally
aggregate agents’ private beliefs based on these predictions
— to compute the distribution of the random variable as if
she had observed the samples of all agents.
This paper focuses on designing elicitation mechanisms
to achieve this optimal aggregation. We show that when the
prior distribution of the unknown parameters comes from a
conjugate prior family of the distribution of the random vari-
able, the principal can leverage a few independent samples
that she observes to successfully elicit enough information
from the agents to achieve the optimal aggregation. This re-
lies on important properties of the conjugate prior family.
Intuitively, we use the hyperparameter of a distribution in
the conjugate family to quantify the confidence of an agent’s
belief as the hyperparameter encodes information about the
samples that the agent has observed. Our mechanisms work
by eliciting predictions that allow the principal to infer the
confidence of the agents and then make use of the confidence
to achieve the optimal aggregation.
In particular, we prove that the principal can leverage a
single sample to achieve optimal aggregation if and only
if each distribution (modulo an equivalence relation) in the
conjugate family maps to a unique hyperparameter. With
this, we demonstrate how elicitation and optimal aggrega-
tion work for many common distributions of the random
variable, including the Poisson, Normal, and uniform dis-
tributions, among others.
When the unique mapping condition is not satisfied, such
as in the rain example above, we show that the hyperparam-
eter of an agent’s posterior distribution cannot be inferred
with the principal’s single sample. Fortunately, in this set-
ting we construct a mechanism where the principal can still
achieve the optimal aggregation if she has access to two in-
dependent samples of the random variable. Our mechanism
simply asks each agent for his believed distribution of the
first sample, and the likelihood that the two samples are the
same. We show that this simple and intuitive approach gives
the principal second-order information about agents’ beliefs,
which is enough to achieve optimal aggregation.
1.1 Related Work
Our problem simultaneously considers both one-shot elicita-
tion of information from multiple agents and the subsequent
aggregation of the information.
In one-shot elicitation, the principal interacts with each
agent independently and the agents report their predic-
tions without knowing others’ predictions. There is a rich
literature on mechanisms for one-shot elicitation. The
simplest is the classical proper scoring rules (Brier 1950;
Winkler 1969; Savage 1971; Gneiting and Raftery 2007),
which incentivize risk-neutral agents to honestly report
their predictions. Proper scoring rules are the build-
ing blocks for most elicitation mechanisms, including
our mechanisms in this paper. To reduce the total pay-
ment of the principal, researchers design shared scor-
ing rules (Kilgour and Gerchak 2004; Johnstone 2007)
and wagering mechanisms (Lambert et al. 2008;
Lambert et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2014) that have vari-
ous desirable theoretical properties. Both shared scoring
rules and wagering mechanisms engage agents in a one-shot
betting to elicit their information and do not require the
principal to subsidize the betting. In contrast to our problem,
all these one-shot elicitation mechanisms do not consider
the aggregation of the elicited information.
Sequential mechanisms have been designed to both
elicit and aggregate information from agents. Most well
known probably are prediction markets (Berg et al. 2001;
Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004), especially the market scor-
ing rules mechanism (Hanson 2003; Hanson 2007), where
agents can sequentially interact with the market mechanism
for multiple times to reveal their information. Information
aggregation happens when agents update their beliefs after
observing other agents’ activities in the market. However,
the dynamic nature of these mechanisms can induce compli-
cated strategic play and obfuscate individual-level informa-
tion (Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel 2001; Chen et al. 2010;
Gao, Zhang, and Chen 2013). In this paper, we let the prin-
cipal rather than the agents take the responsibility of aggre-
gating information, and couple aggregation with one-shot
elicitation that is incentive compatible for the agents.
To achieve optimal aggregation, the principal in our pa-
per needs to know the confidence of agents’ predictions.
The work of Fang, Stinchcombe, and Whinston (2007) is the
closest to ours in this perspective. They consider the one-
shot elicitation of both agents’ predictions and the precision
of their predictions and then use the elicited precision to op-
timally aggregate. They use Normal distributions to model
both the distribution of the random variable and the prior dis-
tribution of the unknown parameters. We consider general
parameterized distributions of the random variable and their
corresponding conjugate priors, which include the model of
Fang, Stinchcombe, and Whinston (2007) as a special case.
2 Model and Background
We introduce our model, which describes how agents form
their beliefs, the principal’s elicitation mechanism, the prin-
cipal’s aggregation goal, and a family of parameterized prior
distributions that we will focus on in this paper.
2.1 Beliefs of Agents
The principal would like to get information from m agents
about a random variable with observable outcome space X .
The distribution of the random variable comes from a param-
eterized family of distributions {p(x|θ)}θ∈Θ ⊆ ∆X , where
Θ is the parameter space.1 There exists a prior distribution
p(θ) over the parameters. Both {p(x|θ)}θ∈Θ and p(θ) are
common knowledge to the agents and the principal.
Nature draws the true parameter θ∗, which is unknown
to both the agents and the principal, according to the prior
p(θ). Each agent then receives some number of samples
from X which drawn independently according to p(x|θ∗).
In other words, if x1, . . . , xN is an enumeration of all sam-
ples received by any of the agents, then p(xi, xj |θ∗) =
p(xi|θ∗)p(xj |θ∗) for all i, j and all θ∗ ∈ Θ.
Agents form their beliefs about the random variable ac-
cording to the Bayes’ rule. If an agent receives samples
x1, . . . , xN , then we write the agent’s belief as
p = p(x|x1, . . . , xN ) =
∫
Θ
p(x|θ)p(θ|x1, . . . , xN )dθ
∝
∫
Θ
p(θ)p(x|θ)
∏
j
p(xj |θ)dθ . (1)
This distribution is known as the posterior predictive distri-
bution (PPD) of x given samples x1, . . . , xN , and will be a
central object of our analysis.
2.2 Elicitation and Scoring Rules
An important feature of our model is that the principal has
access to a sample x ∈ X herself, and can leverage this
sample using scoring rule techniques to elicit information
from the agents. The principal’s sample is also indepen-
dently drawn according to p(x|θ∗). (In Section 4, we will
allow the principal to have two such samples.)
The principal will choose a report space R and a scoring
mechanism S : R × X → R, and request a report ri ∈ R
from each agent i. Upon receiving her sample x, the prin-
cipal will give each agent a score of S(ri, x). We assume
that agents seek to maximize their expected score, so that if
agent i believes x ∼ p for some p ∈ ∆X , then he will report
ri ∈ argmaxr∈R Ex∼p[S(r, x)].
Strictly proper scoring rules (Brier 1950;
Gneiting and Raftery 2007) are the basic tools for designing
such scores S that provide good incentive properties. A
scoring rule is strictly proper if and only if reporting one’s
true prediction uniquely maximizes the expected score.
Strictly proper scoring rules are most commonly used for
eliciting a distribution over a finite outcome space, but also
extend naturally to eliciting distributions with continuous
support (Matheson and Winkler 1976) and properties of
1By convention p(x|...) often refers to the entire distribution,
rather than the density value at a particular x; the usage should be
clear from context.
distributions such as moments (Gneiting and Raftery 2007).
For example, the logarithmic scoring rule
S(p, x) = log p(x) (2)
is a popular strictly proper scoring rule for eliciting a distri-
bution over a finiteX , where p(x) is the reported probability
for outcome x. Another popular strictly proper scoring rule,
the Brier score (Brier 1950), can be used to elicit the mean
of a random variable E[x], when taking the following form
S(r, x) = 2rx − r2 (3)
or the first k moments (E[x], . . .E[xk]), when used as
S(r1, . . . , rk, x) =
k∑
i=1
2rix
i − r2i . (4)
2.3 Aggregation
The goal of the principal is to aggregate the information of
the agents to obtain an accurate distribution of the random
variable as if she has access to all of the samples from all
agents. Throughout the paper, we will denote byX this mul-
tiset2 of all observed samples by agents.
Definition 1. Given prior p(θ) and data X distributed
among the agents, the global posterior predictive distribu-
tion (global PPD) is the posterior predictive distribution
p(x|X).
The goal of this paper is to design mechanisms which
truthfully elicit information from agents in such a way that
the global PPD p(x|X) can be computed. We capture this
desideratum in the following definition.
Definition 2. Let S : R × X → R be given, and let
each agent i receive samples X i, with X = ⊎iX i (multi-
set addition). Let ri be the report of agent i, namely ri =
argmaxr Ep(x|Xi)[S(r, x)]. Then S achieves optimal aggre-
gation if there exists some function g : Rm → ∆X such that
g(r1, · · · , rm) = p(x|X).
It is worth noting that the report space R of the elicita-
tion mechanism is often different from the space of PPD, i.e.
∆X . In fact, we will design elicitation mechanisms such that
the elicited reports help the principal to infer the confidence
of agents, capturing the amount of samples that the agents
have experienced, which then enables the optimal aggrega-
tion. This leads to our focus on the conjugate prior family.
As a motivating example, consider the Normal distribu-
tion case, with p(x|θ) = N(θ, 1) and p(θ) = N(µ, 1), where
N(µ, σ2) is the normal distribution with mean µ and vari-
ance σ2. It is well known that an agent i has posterior distri-
bution p(θ|Xi) = N
(
(µ+x1+ · · ·+xni)/(ni+1), 1/(ni+
1)
)
after observing samples Xi = {x1, . . . , xni}. His esti-
mate of the mean of θ is the weighted sum of his sample
and the prior mean. The inverse of the variance, ni + 1,
is called the precision, which encodes the agent’s confi-
dence or experience. Hence, if the principal can elicit mean
estimate µi and precision ni + 1 from each of the m
2We use multisets, or equivalently unordered lists, as when X
is a finite set it is likely that samples will not be unique.
agents, he can calculate the global PPD, which is a Nor-
mal distribution with mean 1
N+1 (µ+
∑
i niµi) and vari-
ance 1
N+1 , where N =
∑
i ni. This is the case studied by
Fang, Stinchcombe, and Whinston (2007). We will see next
that the general notion of conjugate priors will allow us to
preserve the important aggregation properties we require el-
egantly.
2.4 Conjugate Priors
In this paper, we focus on prior distributions p(θ) that
come from the conjugate prior family for distributions
{p(x|θ)}θ∈Θ. This ensures that the posterior distribution on
θ is in the same family of distributions as the prior p(θ) and
also simplifies the optimal aggregation problem.
While many notions of conjugate priors appear in the lit-
erature (Fink 1997; Gelman et al. 2013), we adopt the fol-
lowing definition, which says that the conjugate prior family
is parameterized by hyperparametrs ν and n which are lin-
early updated after observing samples: the new parameters
can be written as a linear combination of the old parameters
and sufficient statistics for the samples.
Definition 3. Let P = {p(x|θ) : θ ∈ Θ} ⊆ ∆X be given. A
family of distributions {p(θ|ν, n) : ν ∈ Rk, n ∈ R+} ⊆ ∆Θ
is a conjugate prior family for P if there exists a statistic φ :
X → Rk such that, given the prior distribution p(θ|ν0, n0),
the posterior distribution on θ after observing x,
p(θ|ν0, n0, x) =
p(θ|ν0, n0)p(x|θ)∫
Θ p(θ
′|ν0, n0)p(x|θ′)dθ′
, (5)
is equal to p(θ|ν0 + φ(x), n0 + 1) for all ν0 and n0.
Using conjugate priors, the optimal aggregation problem
simplifies considerably. Given prior p(θ|ν0, n0) and data
X = {x1, . . . , xN} distributed among the agents, the global
PPD can be written succinctly as
p(x|ν0, n0, X) = p
(
x
∣∣∣ ν0 + N∑
i=1
φ(xi), n0 +N
)
. (6)
We can see that as we require n to update by 1 for each
additional sample, n − n0 exactly corresponds to the num-
ber of samples seen in total. This is precisely the notion of
confidence we wish to quantify — the amount of data or ex-
perience that led to a prediction. In particular, if we could
obtain the hyperparameters (νi, ni) for an agent’s report, we
could directly compute the number of samplesNi = ni−n0
they observed, as well as the sum of the sufficient statistics
of their samples,
∑
x∈Xi φ(x). If the principal can gather
these two quantities from each agent i, then using the identi-
ties
∑
x∈Xi φ(x) = νi− ν0 andNi = ni−n0, the principal
can aggregate these parameters by the observation that
N∑
i=1
φ(xi) =
m∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
φ(x) =
m∑
i=1
(νi − ν0) (7)
N =
m∑
i=1
Ni =
m∑
i=1
(ni − n0) . (8)
From here, the principal simply plugs these values into
eq. (6) to obtain the global PPD.
3 Unique Predictive Distributions
In this section, we show how the principal can leverage a
single sample x ∈ X to elicit the hyperparameters of the
posterior distributions of the agents, provided that the map-
ping from hyperparameters to predictive posterior distribu-
tions is unique. Note that this statement contains two differ-
ent types of posterior distributions, and as the distinction is
important we take a moment to recall their differences. Af-
ter making his observations, an agent will have updated his
hyperparameters to (ν, n). This gives him a posterior distri-
bution p(θ|ν, n) over the parameter of the random variable
and a predictive posterior distribution (PPD) p(x|ν, n) of the
random variable itself.
We begin with two simple but important results. The first
is an analog of the revelation principle from economic the-
ory, showing that the most a principal with a single sample
x ∈ X can get from an agent is the agent’s private belief
p ∈ ∆X about x.
Lemma 1. Given a sample x ∈ X which an agent believes
to be drawn from p ∈ ∆X , any information obtained with a
mechanism S : R× X → R, from an agent maximizing his
expected score, can be written as a function of p.
Proof. We need only find a function f : ∆X →R such that
f(p) ∈ argmaxr∈R Ex∼p[S(r, x)] whenever the argmax
exists. Let r0 ∈ R be arbitrary. For all p ∈ ∆X , simply
select rp ∈ argmaxr∈R Ex∼p[S(r, x)], or rp = r0 if the
argmax is not defined, and let f(p) = rp.
While intuitive and almost obvious, Lemma 1 is quite use-
ful when thinking about elicitation problems. For example,
in our setting it is certainly clear that the principal can take
R = ∆X and use any strictly proper scoring rule to get the
agent’s PPD p(x|ν, n). One might be tempted, however, to
try to get more information: if one could simply elicit the
posterior p(θ|ν, n), then the hyperparametrs (ν, n) would
be readily available for aggregation. One tantalizing scheme
would be to compute the distribution p(θ|x) and draw a sam-
ple θˆ ∼ p(θ|x), and then use this θˆ to elicit p(θ|ν, n) using
the log scoring rule (2). Lemma 1 says that, while this may
succeed, it will only succeed when the principal could have
simply computed p(θ|ν, n) from the PPD p(x|ν, n) to begin
with.
For precisely this reason, we will see that being able to
map the PPD to the posterior distribution is crucial to being
able to optimally aggregate. Before proving this, we need to
introduce some more precise notation to describe the rela-
tionship between the hyperparameters and the PPD.
Definition 4. Given hyperparameters (ν0, n0), we say
(ν, n) is reachable from (ν0, n0) if there exists a multiset X
of X such that ν = ν0+
∑
x∈X φ(x) and n = n0+ |X |. Ad-
ditionally, we define the relation (ν, n) ≡ (ν′, n′) if for all
suchX , including ∅, we have p(x|ν, n,X) = p(x|ν′, n′, X).
Theorem 2. Given a family of distributions {p(x|θ)}
and conjugate prior p(θ|ν0, n0), there exists a mechanism
S achieving optimal aggregation if and only if for all
(ν, n) and (ν′, n′) reachable from (ν0, n0) we have that
p(x|ν, n) = p(x|ν′, n′) implies (ν, n) ≡ (ν′, n′).
Proof. We first prove the if direction. Let S be the log
scoring rule (2); then by propriety, the principal elicits
pi = p(x|ν0, n0, Xi) = p(x|νi, ni) for all i. From pi the
principal cannot necessarily compute (νi, ni), but she can
choose some (ν′i, n′i) reachable from (ν0, n0) such that pi =
p(x|ν′i, n
′
i). We will show that since (νi, ni) ≡ (ν′i, n′i), this
is enough to optimally aggregate. We will restrict to the
case of two agents; the rest then follows by induction. Let
φ(X) =
∑
x∈X φ(x); by reachability, we haveX ′1,X ′2 such
that ν′i = ν0 + φ(X ′i) and n′ = n0 + |X ′i|. Thus,
p(x|ν0 +
∑
i(ν
′
i − ν0), n0 +
∑
i(n
′
i − n0))
= p(x|ν′2 + (ν
′
1 − ν0), n
′
2 + (n
′
1 − n0))
= p(x|ν′2 + φ(X
′
1), n
′
2 + |X
′
1|)
∗
= p(x|ν2 + φ(X
′
1), n2 + |X
′
1|)
= p(x|ν2 + (ν
′
1 − ν0), n2 + (n
′
1 − n0))
= p(x|ν′1 + (ν2 − ν0), n
′
1 + (n2 − n0))
= p(x|ν′1 + φ(X2), n
′
1 + |X2|)
∗
= p(x|ν1 + φ(X2), n1 + |X2|)
= p(x|ν1 + (ν2 − ν0), n1 + (n2 − n0))
= p(x|ν0 +
∑
i(νi − ν0), n0 +
∑
i(ni − n0)) ,
which is the global PPD. The starred equations used the fact
that (νi, ni) ≡ (ν′i, n′i).
For the only-if direction, assume that there are X,X ′
such that for ν = ν0 + φ(X) and ν′ = ν0 + φ(X ′), we
have p(x|ν, n) = p(x|ν′, n′) but (ν, n) 6≡ (ν′, n′). Then
we have some multiset X1 of X such that p(x|ν, n,X1) 6=
p(x|ν′, n′, X1). Now let agent 1 receive X1, and consider
two worlds, one in which X2 = X and the other in which
X2 = X
′
. By Lemma 1, without loss of generality, the prin-
cipal uses S to elicit the PPD from both agents. However,
she cannot distinguish between these two worlds, as by as-
sumption agent 2’s PPD is the same in both. Unfortunately,
the global PPDs in these two situations are different:
p(x|ν0, n0, X1 ⊎X) = p(x|ν, n,X1)
6= p(x|ν′, n′, X1)
= p(x|ν0, n0, X1 ⊎X
′) .
Hence, the principal is unable to optimally aggregate.
An important corollary of Theorem 2, which we will
make extensive use of below, is that the principal can always
optimally aggregate if the PPD gives her full information
about the hyperparameters.
Corollary 3. If the map ϕ : (ν, n) 7→ p(x|ν, n) is injective,
the principal can optimally aggregate.
Proof. By injectivity, p(x|ν, n) = p(x|ν′, n′) implies
(ν, n) = (ν′, n′), and ≡ is an equivalence relation. More-
over, any strictly proper scoring rule S suffices as the mech-
anism, as this will elicit the PPD p, and then the principal
can compute (ν, n) = ϕ−1(p).
In the following, we provide several examples illustrat-
ing the utility of Theorem 2, and Corollary 3 in particular.
Before continuing, however, we would like to remark on
some practical consideratons. Strictly speaking, the mecha-
nism given by Corollary 3, which elicits the PPD and inverts
the map ϕ, suffices when the modeling assumptions are all
correct. However, in the case where the model is slightly
off, be it in our conditional independence assumption, the
core family p(x|θ), or even the particular choice of prior,
this approach appears to provide no guarantees. In the ex-
amples that follow, we seek not only to elicit the hyperpa-
rameters of the PPD, but to do so using scoring rules which
provide meaningful information about the PPD regardless of
its form. For example, we show below how to elicit the PPD
for the Poisson distribution with a Gamma prior using a scor-
ing rule for the first and second moment (or equivalently, the
mean and variance). This scoring rule has the property that it
will elicit the correct moments of any distribution, and thus
if the agents’ PPD does not have the assumed form, a prac-
titioner would still have meaningful information about the
agent’s belief for a variety of approximate aggregation tech-
niques.
Poisson Imagine that a citizen science project such as
eBird (Sullivan et al. 2009) wishes to collect observations
about sightings of various birds to deduce bird migration
patterns. Such a project may wish users to report the number
of birds of a particular species seen per minute. Of course, to
combine such estimates, eBird would like to know not only
the observed rate, but how long the user spend bird watch-
ing, so that it may weigh more highly reports from longer
time intervals; this is precisely what our approach offers.
For situations such as this one which involve counting
events in a specified time interval, the Poisson distribution is
a common choice. The parameter of the Poisson distribution
is λ ∈ R, the rate parameter, and the probability of observ-
ing x ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} events in a unit time interval is given
by p(x|λ) = λxe−λ/x!. The canonical conjugate prior for
the Poisson distribution is the Gamma distribution, given by
p(λ|ν, n) = n
ν
Γ(ν)λ
ν−1e−nλ, and the statistic is φ(x) = x.
The form of the PPD p(x|ν, n) is also a familiar distribution,
in the negative binomial family (Gelman et al. 2013, p.44).
As mentioned above, we will show how to compute the
hyperparameters ν and n of the PPD from its first two mo-
ments µ1 and µ2. As the form of the PPD is known to
be negative binomial, one can easily calculate or look up
what these moments are in terms of the hyperparameters:
µ1 = ν/n and µ2 = ν(ν + n + 1)/n2. Fortunately, given
these equations, we can simply solve for the hyperparame-
ters in terms of the moments, which we can elicit robustly:
n = µ1/(µ2 + µ
2
1 + µ1) and ν = nµ1. This already veri-
fies the injectivity condition of Corollary 3, so we know that
optimal aggregation is possible.
For concreteness, let us return to the bird watching exam-
ple to show how eBird might reward users in such a way
as to truthfully obtain predictions and then compute their
optimal aggregation. The protocol would be for eBird to an-
nounce that a representative will be sent tomorrow to count
the number x of birds seen in a minute, and to ask each user
i for a prediction ri,1 about E[x] and ri,2 about E[x2], with
the understanding that after the count x is revealed, agent i
will receive a reward (cf. (4)) of
S(ri,1, ri,2, x) = 2ri,1x− r
2
i,1 + 2ri,2x
2 − r2i,2 . (9)
With the reports in hand, eBird can compute ni =
ri,1/(ri,2 + r
2
i,1 + ri,1) and νi = niri,1. Assuming the
common prior parameters (ν0, n0) are known, eBird sim-
ply aggregates these reports to n = n0 +
∑m
i=1(ni − n0)
and ν = ν0 +
∑m
i=1(νi − ν0), arriving at the global PPD
p(x|X) = p(x|ν, n).
Normal As we saw in Section 2, the Normal distribution
with known variance but unknown mean allows for optimal
aggregation. This follows easily from Corollary 3 as well,
since N(µ, σ2) is a different distribution for each setting of
µ, σ.
Uniform Perhaps the most natural of distributions is the
uniform distribution on [0, θ], where p(x|θ) = 1/θ in that
interval. As a simple application, consider the problem of
determining the number of raffle tickets sold at a fair by ask-
ing random people what their ticket number is. It is well-
known that the Pareto distribution is a conjugate prior for
this case, and the hyperparameter update is ν = max(ν0, x)
and n = n0 + 1. Observe that the hyperparameter update
is not linear, so we cannot simply apply Corollary 3. How-
ever, it is easy to see that the conclusion still holds here,
as the principal can easily aggregate {(νi, ni)}mi by taking
ν = max{νi}mi=0 and n = n0 +
∑
i(ni − n0) as usual.
By a simple calculation, one can show that the PPD in this
case is a mixture of a uniform distribution and a Pareto dis-
tribution, from which one can compute the moments µ1 =
nν/2(n − 1) and µ2 = nν2/3(n − 2). Cancelling ν, these
equations give a quadratic equation with a unique root n sat-
isfying n > 2 (a requirement of the prior), from which ν can
also be calculated. Thus, the principal can achieve optimal
aggregation in this case as well.
4 The Non-Unique Case
Imagine a setting where the principal wants to aggregate in-
formation from agents to estimate the bias of a coin. The
principal asks agents Bob and Carol, who each see some un-
known number of coin flips, after which Bob reports that the
coin is unbiased, whereas Carol reports that it is biased 10-
to-1 toward Heads. With only this information, which cor-
responds to the full PPDs of both agents, it is easily seen to
be impossible to optimally aggregate these reports, as it is
unclear how many flips each agent saw. Even if the princi-
pal knows that Carol saw 20 flips, she cannot tell whether
Bob saw none and just reported the prior, or whether he saw
1000 and is practically certain of the bias of the coin. (For-
mally, we can explain this by noting that the conjugate prior
is the Beta distribution, which does not satisfy Theorem 2.)
How can the principal circumvent this impossibility to still
achieve optimal aggregation in this setting?
In this section we will consider a more general ver-
sion of the coin flip example, using the categorical fam-
ily of distributions, i.e., the whole of ∆X for X = [K] =
{1, 2, . . . ,K}. Here the common conjugate prior is the
Dirichlet distribution p(θ|α), whose hyperparameters α ∈
R
K encode pseudo-counts, so that αi corresponds to the
number of occurrences of outcome i an agent has seen. More
formally, we take Θ = ∆X = ∆K , and for α ∈ RK we let
p(i|θ) = θi , p(θ|α) =
Γ(n)∏K
i=1 Γ(αi)
K∏
i=1
θαi−1i , (10)
where n =
∑K
i=1 αi corresponds to the total number of(pseudo-) samples observed, and Γ is the Gamma distribu-
tion.3 It is well-known that the mean of the Dirichlet distri-
bution is E[θ|α] = α/n, which is just a normalized version
of the pseudo-counts. Taken as an element of ∆X , this is also
the PPD: if an agent sees x= 1 and x= 2 each eight times
and x = 3 four times, then α = (8, 8, 4) and his PPD will
be (2/5, 2/5, 1/5). We can see now why Theorem 2 tells
us that optimal aggregation is impossible: scaling α by any
positive amount yields the same PPD, just as with the coin
flip example above, but when aggregating α’s from multiple
agents, different relative scales yield different global PPDs.
Fortunately, despite this impossibility, we now show that
if the principal can simply obtain two of her own samples,
she can use them both to glean second-order information
from the agents, and then optimally aggregate. The idea be-
hind the mechanism is extremely simple: ask the agent for
the distribution p of the first sample, and the probability b
that the two samples are the same. As discussed above, the
reported p gives α/n, and it turns out that the scaling factor
n, which corresponds to the confidence of the agent, can be
expressed as a simple formula of p and b.
Theorem 4. Let X = [K], and let {p(i|θ)} and {p(θ|α)}
be the categorical and Dirichlet families from eq. (10). Then
given two independent samples x1, x2 ∈ X , the mechanism
S : ∆X × [0, 1]×X × X → R defined by
S(p, b, x1, x2) = log p(x1) + 2b · 1{x1=x2} − b
2 (11)
achieves optimal aggregation.
Proof. Focusing first on a single agent, by propriety of the
log scoring rule, the agent will report p = p( · |α) = α/n,
where once again n =
∑K
i=1 αi. Similarly, by propriety of
the Brier score, the agent will report his belief about the
probability that x1 = x2. We can calculate this easily:
b = Pr[x1 = x2]
= E
θ∼p(θ|α)
[∑K
i=1 p(x1 = i, x2 = i |θ)
]
= E
θ∼p(θ|α)
[∑K
i=1 p(x1 = i |θ)p(x2 = i |θ)
]
= E
θ∼p(θ|α)
[∑K
i=1 θiθi
]
=
∑K
i=1Var[θi|α] + E[θi|α]
2 .
It is known that Var[θi|α] = αi(n−αi)n2(n+1) , so the first term be-
comes∑
i
Var[θi|α] =
(
∑
i αi)n−
∑
i α
2
i
n2(n+ 1)
=
1− ‖p‖2
n+ 1
,
3Note that we have departed from our (ν, n) notation to match
the convention for the Dirichlet distribution; otherwise we could
take ν to be the first K − 1 coordinates of α, and keep n the same.
as we also have
∑
i E[θi|α]
2 = ‖p‖2 = ‖α‖2/n2. Putting
this together, we have b = 1−‖p‖
2
n+1 − ‖p‖
2
, so n = 1−b
b−‖p‖2
and finally α = np. Finally, turning to the aggregation of
multiple predictions, the result follows by the same argu-
ment as in Theorem 2: we simply discount the prior from
each agent’s report and sum.
Returning to the coin flip example, we can now see how
the principal can resolve the dilemma from before. Instead of
simply asking the probability that a single flip is Heads, the
principal should obtain two independent flips and then ask
the agents for the probability that the first is Heads, and the
probability that the two flips are the same. By Theorem 4, the
answers to these two intuitive questions give the principal
enough information to optimally aggregate.
5 Future Work
A well known and broad class of distributions with conju-
gate priors are the exponential families (see Appendix A for
a primer). Many of the examples discussed in this paper fall
into the exponential families, and thus it is a natural ques-
tion to ask whether our results can be shown to hold for all
such distributions. In particular, our study opens two inter-
esting questions, which under the surface would imply some
interesting structure of exponential families.
The first follows naturally from Theorem 2 and the exam-
ples in Section 3, several of which are exponential families,
and all of which admit optimal aggregation. We conjecture
that for exponential families, the success of a single-sample
mechanism depends only on the dimension k of the statistic
φ.
Conjecture 1. Optimal aggregation with a single sample
is possible for an exponential family if and only if |X | >
dimφ+ 1.
The second open question is similar: does the two-sample
technique from Section 4 succeed for all exponential fami-
lies? Again, we conjecture positively.
Conjecture 2. Given an exponential family with statistic φ,
the mechanism which elicits the expected values of φ(x1)
and φ(x1)φ(x2)⊤ can optimally aggregate.
The intuition behind these conjectures, which we outline
in Appendix B, lies in concentration properties in the poste-
rior distribution p(x|ν, n) as n increases to infinity. Because
of the simple form of exponential families, and the exponen-
tial decay inherent in their definition, we believe that these
results can be obtained.
Finally, we would like to mention a possible extension.
While our model assumes that the principal wishes to ag-
gregate all information, in reality, agents may have different
costs to gather their samples, and the principal may there-
fore desire to aggregate a more efficient amount of infor-
mation given this cost. Fang, Stinchcombe, and Whinston
(2007) show that this can be done in a restricted setting with
Normal distributions. Can this still be done in our more gen-
eral setting? What if agents can acquire different amounts
of information at different costs, for example, if a convex
function specifies their cost to acquire any number of sam-
ples? We hope to address these and related questions in fu-
ture work.
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A Exponential families
Perhaps the most important class of distributions which ad-
mit conjugate priors are the exponential families, a broad
class which includes many common distributions such as
normal, log-normal, Poisson, and many more. We briefly re-
view exponential families and their conjugate priors, which
as it turns out are themselves exponential families.
Let φ : X → Rk be the sufficient statistic (a term justi-
fied below). We assume that φ is minimal, meaning 〈θ, φ(x)〉
cannot be a constant function of x for any θ 6= 0. (Minimal-
ity is thus equivalent to affine independence.) Now define
g(θ) = log
∫
X
exp{〈φ(x), θ〉}dx (12)
p(x|θ) = exp{〈φ(x), θ〉 − g(θ)}. (13)
This family {p(x|θ)} is the exponential familiy with respect
to φ. We refer to Θ as the natural parameters, as contrast
to the mean parameters µ(θ) = E[φ|θ], which also param-
eterize the family provided certain regularity conditions are
met (Wainwright and Jordan 2008). The function g is called
the cumulant, and happens to generate the moments of φ un-
der p(x|θ). In particular, we have ∇g(θ) = E[φ|θ] = µ(θ).
Turning now to the conjugate prior for this family, let
h(ν, n) = log
∫
Θ
exp{〈θ, ν〉 − ng(θ)}dθ (14)
p(θ|ν, n) = exp{〈θ, ν〉 − ng(θ)− h(ν, n)}. (15)
One can verify directly that p(θ|ν, n) is a conjugate family
to p(x|θ). Moreover, the priors are themselves exponential
families, with respect to statistic ψ(θ) =
[
θ
−g(θ)
]
.
As we saw above, it is easy to verify by direct calculation
that the cumulant g(θ) satisfies∇g(θ) = Ex∼p(x|θ)[φ(x)]. A
much less obvious fact, but a very useful one, is that the im-
plied mean ν/n of the conjugate prior p(θ|ν, n) is credible,
in the sense that the expected value of φ is in fact ν/n.
Theorem 5 ((Diaconis, Ylvisaker, and others 1979)). Let
p(x|θ) be an exponential family with cumulant g(θ) and let
p(θ|ν, n) be its conjugate prior. Then∫
X
φ(x)p(x|ν, n)dx =
∫
Θ
∇g(θ)p(θ|ν, n) = ν/n. (16)
B Conjectures for Exponential Families
Here we give intuition for the conjectures stated in Section 5.
For the first, Conjecture 1, note that when dim φ = |X | − 1,
and the statistic is minimal, then Θ is just a reparameteri-
zation of the categorical distributions, ∆X . As we saw in
Section 4 that a single sample is insufficient for the categor-
ical case, Conjecture 1 is implied by the following alternate
conjecture.
Conjecture 3. The map ϕ : (ν, n) 7→ p(x|ν, n) is injec-
tive for an exponential family conjugate prior if and only if
dimφ < |X | − 1.
There is considerable intuition for this conjecture. By
Theorem 5 (the credible mean property of exponential fam-
ily conjugate priors), to examine the injectivity of ϕ we may
restrict our attention to a fixed valued of µ = ν/n. This is
because if ν/n 6= ν′/n′, then ϕ(ν, n) 6= ϕ(ν′, n′). Given
this fact, it is clear that the injectivity cannot hold whenever
k
.
= dimφ ≥ |X | − 1, because by minimality of φ, the
mean E[φ] = ν/n = µ must uniquely identify the distribu-
tion, and thus scaling n and taking ν = nµ and yields the
same PPD for all n > 0. Conversely, one can show by the
form of the conjugate prior (15) that for our fixed value of
µ, we have
p(θ|nµ, n)
p(θ′|nµ, n)
=
(
p(θ|µ, 1)
p(θ′|µ, 1)
)n
, (17)
for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and all n, µ. Thus, as n increases there is
strong concentration in the prior about the mode θˆ, which
one can show is equal to ∇g∗(ν/n) by convex conjugacy,
so that µ(θˆ) = µ. It is clear then that the limit of p(x|nµ, n)
as n → ∞ is simply p(x|θˆ). It would therefore be natural
to show that KL(p(x|ν, n) ; p(x|θˆ)), or some other notion
of distance, is monotone decreasing in n, which would then
imply injectivity of ϕ.
For Conjecture 2, the intuition lies in a reparameteriza-
tion of the conjugate prior distribution. Let µ(θ) = ∇g(θ)
denote the mean parameter corresponding to θ, and re-
call from the credible mean property that E[φ(x)|ν, n] =
E[µ(θ)|ν, n] = ν/n. Then by independence of x1, x2, we
have E[φ(x1)φ(x2)⊤|ν, n] = E[µ(θ)µ(θ)⊤|ν, n]. Thus, let-
ting r1 and R2 be the reported values for the E[φ(x1)]
and E[φ(x1)φ(x2)⊤], we see that Var[µ(θ)|ν, n] is simply
R2 − r1r
⊤
1 . In other words, we can use this information
to compute the variance of the posterior distribution of the
mean parameters. That is, if we thought of the posterior as
being a distribution p(µ|ν, n) over mean parameters instead
of over natural parameters θ, we would be able to elicit the
variance of this posterior. Intuitively, this variance should
correspond to the confidence of the agent, and in particular
should be monotone decreasing in n, which would allow us
to compute n and thus optimally aggregate.
